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I. INTRODUCTION
Property law is not a realm where uniform legislation has thrived.
Only a handful of efforts have impressed enough state legislatures to have
meaningful impact. Of the few successes, most are narrow in scope. For
example, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act' deals with the transfer of
property rights in cases when the sequence of deaths among multiple or
competing owners is difficult to prove, and the Uniform Vendor and
Purchaser Risk Act ("UVPRA") 2 allocates losses from casualty and
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia; Former
Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law, Columbus, Ohio. B.A.,
1974, Saint Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota; J.D., 1977, University of Texas School of
Law, Austin, Texas. Professor Smith teaches courses in property law, land use planning, real
estate transactions and development, natural resources, secured transactions, oil and gas law,
and housing law and policy.
The author thanks Ron Brown, Paul Heald, Robin Malloy, and Dick Wellman for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 8B U.L.A. 267 (1993 & Supp. 1995). All states except Louisiana and Ohio have
enacted either the 1940 version or the 1993 version of the Act. Id. at 29, 41 (Supp. 1995).
2. 14 U.L.A. 469 (1990).
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condemnation that occur while real property is subject to a contract of sale,
prior to closing.
In property, success has befallen only two uniform acts that have
breadth, in that they treat an entire topic or type of legal relationship. The
Uniform Probate Code ("UPC")3 and the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act ("URLTA")4 stand alone in this regard. First, approximately
half of the states have adopted all or a significant part of the UPC. Ap-
proved in 1969, and expanded and amended several times since, it provides
comprehensive treatment for the transmission of property at an owner's
death via probate and nonprobate transfers, guardianship, and related
matters. Second, the URLTA, approved in 1972, has garnered adoption by
fifteen states.' It provides statutory rules governing all facets of the
landlord-tenant relationship for residential tenancies.
The most ambitious effort at uniform property legislation ever launched
was the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA") 6 and its companion, the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA"). 7 Both measures
caught the eyes of property scholars,' including law casebook authors,9
most of whom were generally approving. Both Acts, however, met with
singular failure in the sense of uniform legislative shunning and have not
substantially influenced judges in their lawmaking roles. In published
3. 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
4. 7B U.L.A. 427 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
5. During the 1970s, 13 states, beginning with Hawaii in 1972, enacted the URLTA.
Its sails have lost the wind; since then there have been only two adoptions, Rhode Island and
South Carolina, both in 1986. Id. at 60 (Supp. 1995).
6. U.L.T.A. (1975).
7. U.S.L.T.A. (1976).
8. See, e.g., Jon W. Bruce, An Overview of the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 10 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1980); Robert
Brussack, Reform of American Conveyancing Formality, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1981);
Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., Simplifying Land Transfers: The Recordation and Marketable Title
Provisions of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 62 OR. L. REv. 363 (1983).
9. See, e.g., JOHN CRIBBET & CORWIN JOHNSON, PROPERTY, at xviii (4th ed. 1978)
(stating that adoption of the Acts by the Commissioners "points the way toward further
reform in the law relating to the sale of land"); GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (2d ed. 1981) (stating that the ULTA
"represents an interesting and often useful alternative to existing legal rules," to which the
authors refer throughout the book). Recent casebooks generally pay much less attention to
the ULTA and the USLTA than those published in the 1970s and early 1980s.
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opinions, very few courts have relied upon the ULTA or USLTA positions
for analogous support.10
Why did a single state legislature, somewhere in America, not pass at
least one of the Acts? More than twenty years have elapsed since
promulgation, so certainly they have had time. Causation, often a prime
concern of lawyers, is tricky here. When a legislature enacts a statute, it is
often hard to pick one's way through the process to determine precisely why
the legislature acted and why it made particular drafting choices. Legislative
history for state statutes, compared to federal acts, is often sketchy. On
occasion, there is no extant written history. But at least the legislature has
spoken through its vote and the words of the act.
Here, we are investigating the legislature's refusal to speak or its lack
of interest. When the law, in its examination of human conduct, recognizes
the distinction between an affirmative act and an omission, as it often does,
the distinction typically is grounded on the difficulty of ascribing intent or
motivation to an omission. This raises an important caveat for our purposes.
We cannot tell for sure why the legislatures eschewed the USLTA and the
ULTA. There may be no single reason. In some states, there may have
been more pressing legislative business for a number of sessions; in other
states, there may have been no energetic proponents or available sponsors;
in others, a searching study may have disclosed that the Acts' principles
were not compatible with the states' perceived needs.
My purpose is not to make a comprehensive study either of the causes
for legislative rejection of the Acts or of the merits of the Acts' provisions.
As indicated above, one cannot be certain that lack of adoption is due to a
perception that the Acts' substantive principles are deficient in terms of
policy. My suggestion, however, is that one plausible explanation for the
failure to garner adoptions is that the core principles of the Acts were
rejected on their merits. The rejection occurred not because the principles
are intrinsically flawed (which may or may not be the case), but because
they embody major reforms that do not respond to contemporary market
needs. Instead, the proposed reforms ignore market changes, including
10. A Westlaw search conducted by the author on January 24, 1996, revealed 30
published opinions citing the ULTA (27 in state courts and 3 in federal courts) and 3
published opinions (all in state courts) citing the USLTA. A majority of those opinions rely
on the Acts to some extent, typically by pointing out that the rule they announce is
compatible with or resembles the Acts' rule. Given the two decades since adoption of the
Acts and the volumes of real property cases decided since, this is a small number of
citations, reflecting minimal impact on the judiciary.
1996] 1167
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developing market-based solutions to legal problems concerning real estate
transactions.
II. MARKET CHANGES AND LAW REFORM
The real estate markets of today, as well as those of the 1970s when
the Acts were approved, are vastly different from those of the early part of
this century. Earlier, both real estate sales and loans tended to be local in
nature, with the parties often having continuing, and sometimes personal,
relationships. Seller and buyer often lived in the same community and, if
not well acquainted, they may have known of the other's reputation. The
borrower, whether commercial or residential, knew his local banker. Real
estate transactions involving local parties, just as today, sometimes fell apart
and generated disputes, but local legal rules and local norms generally
proved adequate to resolve them. Whether an outsider from a community
in another state would understand those rules and norms was not considered
to be of much importance. If an outsider chose to enter the local market,
it was at his peril to ascertain the local rules by, for example, hiring a local
agent or attorney.
This century the markets for real estate sales and finance matured,
becoming mammoth in size at the national level and much larger at the local
level in many American communities. Like other aspects of the American
economy, the parties to transactions increasingly were strangers. Growing
numbers of transactions involved parties from different communities, and as
cities expanded, fewer residents knew each other. More property transac-
tions with interstate dimensions took place.
Law evolves to respond to economic and social changes. Radically
different real estate markets raised new problems, which existing property
law and existing institutions were ill-equipped to handle. Persons entering
large, depersonalized real estate markets needed certain legal protections,
which existing law failed to provide. Buyers of new housing, who paid a
price based on the assumption that the unit was satisfactory in quality and
free of significant defects, no longer dealt with a local merchant who had
a known track record and felt a need to preserve local goodwill.
Law and markets interact in many different ways. A particular legal
problem, if and when it is solved, may be solved in any number of ways:
by judicial efforts to revamp the common law, by federal legislation or
regulation, bv uniform or nonuniform state legislation, by private ordering
accomplished by market participants, or by structural changes in markets as
institutions evolve and new institutions emerge. Such approaches are not,
of course, mutually exclusive. Responses to a given problem may include
a mix from the above list. For example, judicial decisions may spark and
[Vol. 201168
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inform the drafting of legislation. In property, this combination gave birth
to the URLTA. It was a reaction to the tide of judicial decisions embracing
the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. Similarly, in
residential finance, reform came from the interplay between the private
mortgage markets and new federal laws. During the 1970s and 1980s, the
thriving secondary mortgage market created strong pressure for national
standards for residential mortgage products."
The drafters of the ULTA and the USLTA naturally believed that many
problems in real estate transactions were amenable to solution by uniform
state legislation. A person not so persuaded, of course, would not join the
effort nor expend valuable time on the project. For a number of the
problems addressed by the Acts, the drafters missed the mark at this initial
level of decision. They too readily embraced the idea that a state code,
compared to other approaches, was a useful response. In particular, they
failed to recognize that other institutions were coping with the perceived
problems and with increasing effectiveness.
Il. TENSION BETWEEN GOALS OF UNIFoRMrrY AND IDEALISM
The Acts proposed many changes to well-established property
doctrines. The drafters were not timid. They strove to fashion an ideal set
of reformed rules which would govern the entire system of real estate sales,
titles, and finance. As a general proposition, the more major changes
contained in a proposed new statute, the more difficult it is to get it enacted.
Lawmakers, legislators as well as judges, are accustomed to making
incremental, modest changes. When a proposal envisions an entirely new
scheme, a legislature must be willing to swallow the entire thing. The
broader the new scheme, the more likely it is that some part of the scheme
will prove unpalatable, leading to rejection of the whole.
This general principle has special meaning when the proposed statute
is a uniform act. Success is not achieved if one or a few states adopt it.
The overriding hope, implicit in the title "uniform," is widespread adoption
by many states. For this reason, the goal of uniformity, in the sense of
widespread state adoptions, is generally incompatible with an "ideal" code
that seeks a large number of major reforms. This is simply an application
of commonplace notion that plans imbued with an excess of idealism are not
likely to succeed. Idealism must be tempered with realism. Uniform or
widespread acceptability and revolutionary legal change inherently conflict.
11. See Robin P. Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in
Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991 (1986).
19961 1169
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Thus, proponents of codes and uniform laws should limit the number
of major changes they propose to a relative few, picking those changes that
are clearly merited in terms of policy and meaningful in terms of real-world
impact. It is an uphill battle unless, prior to the proposal, there already
exists a broad consensus that substantial flaws exist in the present system
that the bill targets for reform. In contrast, such a consensus attended the
success of other uniform legislation. Notably, both the UPC and the
URLTA responded to "headline causes," as did the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") years earlier.12
With respect to real estate transactions, there was no such consensus
that the system had substantial legal defects in the 1970s, nor is there one
now. The proponents of the Acts, therefore, had the burden of convincing
the legal community that the major reforms contained therein were necessary
and important. This burden they failed to carry because the Acts attempted
to reform established principles that no longer needed reformation. There
simply was not sufficient market pressure to revamp the whole system. To
the contrary, market forces were aligned to resist such drastic revision.
The remainder of this article explains the market context surrounding
four of the Acts' reform proposals, identifying two reasons why there was
(and is) relatively little need for adoption of the Acts' reforms. First, in
some subject matter areas, institutions other than courts and legislatures had
developed, or were developing, alternative solutions to the problems at hand.
Two examples, discussed below, are warranties of quality for new homes
and formal requirements for deeds. Second, in other areas, alternative
solutions were being achieved by private ordering by the parties engaging
in the transactions. Two examples, discussed below, are risk of loss and
specific performance. Both areas are alike in that the Acts' proposals were
behind the times. The major problems addressed by the Acts were serious
problems earlier this century, but when the problems had reached a
sufficient magnitude, the market responded by finding solutions that
developed in small, incremental steps. Real estate markets and institutions
had changed drastically by the 1970s, and the Acts failed to take full
account of those changes. Perhaps the Acts, in the forms they were
promulgated, would have succeeded in the 1940s or 1950s, but they were
too late to succeed today.
12. For example, Article 9 directly responded to substantial market concerns in many
states about the validity of a "floating lien" on a business' personal property. See U.C.C. art.
9, 3 U.L.A. 1 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
1170 [Vol. 20
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IV. SOLUTIONS FROM NONLEGAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Protecting Buyers from Homebuilders
The consumer protection movement came of age in the 1970s. In
property law, one of its prime manifestations was the implied warranty of
quality, developed by courts to protect the expectations of buyers of new
homes. The implied warranty replaced the doctrine of caveat emptor, which
shielded real estate sellers from post-closing liability for housing defects,
except to the extent the seller gave an express warranty that survived
closing.1
3
Adoption of the implied warranty followed and lagged behind reforms
in the sales of personal property. Courts analogized to the protections
afforded buyers of goods under the law of sales, recently codified in the
UCC, reasoning that buyers of new housing deserved equivalent protec-
tion. 4 This legal development recognized the changes in housing markets
and methods of construction that have taken place this century. Once when
many homes were custom-built by local builders who used local craftsmen,
the typical purchaser might personally select a builder, based upon
reputation and other factors, and become actively involved in the process of
designing the house and supervising its construction. Today most homes are
sold just like other commercial products. They are mass produced on a
speculative basis, built according to stock plans, with the typical purchaser
relying not on the personal characteristics of the builder, but solely on
advertising, the salespersons' presentations, and the product appearance.
Affected by the tide of consumerism sweeping the law in the 1970s,
which included the judicial implied warranty as one facet, the ULTA set
forth an implied warranty for the sale of new housing by a merchant
13. For a comprehensive analysis of implied warranties, see Jeff Sovem, Toward a
Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates,
Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L.
REv. 13 (advocating system of standardized warranties, with disclosure to buyers of warranty
choices, including choice of disclaiming all warranties).
14. The nature and content of the implied warranty varied somewhat from state to state,
partially because of differences in how closely they tailored the new warranty to the personal
property analogue. Some states called the warranty an "implied warranty of habitability,"
protecting the buyer only from extreme defects such as structural flaws that threatened the
buyer's safety or made the unit wholly unlivable. Other courts conferred broader protection,
analogizing to the UCC warranties of merchantability for the sale of goods.
1996] 1171
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seller. 5 This is not exceptional, although the scope of the warranty is
substantially broader than that developed by prevailing caselaw. What is
exceptional, however, was the ULTA's decision to make the implied
warranty incapable of disclaimer, waiver, or modification by buyers who
occupy or intend to occupy the property. 16 The home buyer, given the
ULTA moniker of "protected party,"' 7 is shielded from vicissitudes of
freedom of contract. The apparent rationale is that home buyers lack the
ability, information, and bargaining power to negotiate for express
warranties of quality, and that without a mandatory statutory warranty, home
buyers would be routinely victimized by sellers who contractually disclaim
all liability for housing defects."s In making the warranty mandatory, the
ULTA rejected the position taken by a majority of courts, which treat the
judicial implied warranty as implied in fact and thus capable of disclaimer
in accordance with general principles of contract law. 9 Courts have
tended to look at disclaimers and modifications on a case-by-case basis,
showing a high degree of deference to parties' contracts when the disclaimer
is clearly expressed and conspicuous. Instead of deferring to these evolving
judicial standards, the ULTA took the blunderbuss approach of invalidating
all waivers of implied warranties of quality by protected parties.
15. Under U.L.T.A. § 2-309(b):
[a] seller.., in the business of selling real estate impliedly warrants that the real
estate is suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any
[new] improvements ... will be:
(1) free from defective materials; and
(2) constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound
engineering and construction standards, and in a workmanlike manner.
Id.
16. Id. § 2-311(c). The Act has a minor exception for known defects that the parties
bargain over. Id. (stating, "seller may disclaim liability for a specific defect ... if the defect
... entered into and became a part of the basis of the bargain"). It has no bearing on the
major problem, which is the allocation of risk between seller and buyer with respect to
defects that are become evident only after the time of contracting or closing.
17. Id. § 1-203 (defining "protected party" to include an individual who buys improved
residential real estate and who occupies or intends to occupy all or part of the real estate as
a residence).
18. The ULTA position treats the home buyers the same as residential tenants, which
a majority of jurisdictions protect with a nonwaivable implied warranty of habitability.
19. See, e.g., Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,
643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982), overruled on other grounds by, Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987); Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983). The
UCC similarly permits waivers of implied warranties for the sale of new goods. U.C.C. §
2-316(2), IA U.L.A. 465 (1989).
1172 [Vol. 20
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More importantly, the ULTA warranty of quality ignores reforms
emanating from the homebuilding industry. When the ULTA was adopted
in 1975, the industry was in the nascent stage of addressing the problem of
new housing defects by a system of standardized, express warranties. Many
builders offer their own express warranties, but more significant are
warranties given or guaranteed by third-parties. The most prominent of such
warranties, known as the Home Owner's Warranty ("HOW") Program, was
founded by the National Association of Home Builders in 1972. The
program is voluntary, and builders who meet the program's standards are
eligible to enroll.20 A buyer who purchases from a participating builder
receives a HOW policy, which insures against a range of defects for certain
time periods, which vary according to the type of defect.21 The builder
pays the HOW Corporation approximately one-third of one percent of the
sales price of the house for the policy. Over the years, the HOW plan has
covered more than two million homes, a total representing approximately
half of the market for third-party warranties.
There are three other major private warranty programs operated by the
Home Buyers Warranty Corporation, the Residential Warranty Corporation,
the Professional Warranty Corporation. 2 Since 1994, the HOW Corpora-
tion has struggled with solvency problems,23 and its competitors are as-
suming a greater share of the market. Today, the HOW program and other
warranty programs are well known, not only among real estate professionals,
but also among knowledgeable home buyers. Participation in a national
warranty program is a marketing advantage, and builders often advertise this
feature of their product. According to a recent estimate, in 1995 almost
ninety percent of new home buyers obtained an express warranty, with one-
third of them issued by warranty companies, and the rest issued by the builder2
20. The standards relate to construction expertise, financial stability, and customer
relations.
21. All defects in materials and workmanship are insured for the first year. Building
systems, such as plumbing, heating, and air conditioning, are insured for 3 years and major
structural defects are insured for 10 years.
22. See Elizabeth Razzi, Buying a Home Before It's Built, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN.
MAG., Aug. 1995, at 77.
23. In October 1994, the HOW Corporation was placed in receivership by the State of
Virginia. Apparently, the premiums it charged were too low to cover the risk of housing
defects it insured. The receiver has satisfied claims brought by insured homeowners at 40%.
See Pat Rosen, HOW Offering 40 Percent on Claims, HOUSTON POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at Cl.
24. See Elizabeth Birge, A Warranty Is Only as Good as the Builder Behind It, CHICAGO
TRIB., Nov. 11, 1995, at HG1 (citing estimate of William Young, Director of Consumer
Affairs for the National Association of Home Builders).
11731996]
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Although the HOW program has received criticism on the basis that it
over protects the builder,25 in a number of key respects, third-party
warranties better protect buyers than would the ULTA proposal. First, like
other express warranties for the sales of other products, if a defect appears
within the policy time limits, it is covered. Unlike the implied warranty, the
buyer does not have to prove that the defect existed at the time of closing
or completion of construction. Depending on the character of the defect,
proof that because something is wrong now a defect existed years ago can
be a substantial evidentiary burden. Second, under the HOW plan, if there
is a dispute concerning the warranty, the buyer has the right to submit the
matter to an arbitrator, whose decision binds the builder, but not the buyer.
Last but not least, the builder's warranty obligations are insured by the
third-party warranty company. The buyer does not bear the full risk that the
builder may become insolvent during the policy period, and in the home-
building industry, where many small businesses fail, especially during
housing recessions, this risk is material.26
The HOW program was in its infancy at the time of ULTA adoption.
The weakness of the ULTA approach lies not in its authors' lack of
prescience; who could foresee in the 1970s that the standardized warranties
would evolve to become the dominant form of quality protection for new
home buyers? Rather, the problem with the ULTA approach is that it
assumed that the private market could not solve the problem of new housing
defects, and government-mandated warranties, forced upon market
participants whether they wanted it or not, was the only viable alternative.
The rigidity of the ULTA warranty rules, had they been legislatively
enacted, would have effectively precluded development of national
standardized warranties.
B. Eliminating the Formalities of Conveyancing
Formalism has long been a whipping boy in legal circles. A dominant
theme of twentieth century private law is to eliminate formal rules, replacing
them with flexible, case-sensitive rules that look to the substance of the
25. E.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Consumer Protection and National Housing Policy: The
Problem of New-Home Defects, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 527, 533 (1979); FTC STAFF,
HOUSING POLICY SESSION BRIEFING BOOK 39 (1978).
26. The buyer reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of an insolvent warrantor, a point
illustrated by the recent receivership of the HOW Corporation. Purchasers of HOW policies,
nonetheless, are in a better position than they would be with no third-party warranty at all
because they receive part payment of claims from the receiver and retain the right to proceed
against the builder for the deficiency.
[Vol. 201174
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parties' understandings and interests. The UCC exemplifies this approach.
Consider two prime examples from Article 2 and Article 9. With respect
to contracts of sale, title to the goods no longer serves as a linchpin to
define the parties' relative rights and obligations. With respect to secured
transactions, the form of the parties' security agreement is irrelevant;
regardless of form, if the substance of the parties' agreement is that personal
property secures the performance of an obligation, a single set of Article 9
rules govern their relationship.
Yet all vestiges of formalism have not disappeared from our legal
system, and modem scholars recognize that some formal rules may promote
important policies.27 The law of modem real estate transfers has worked
out an accommodation between the competing ideals of formalism and anti-
formalism. The resulting dialectic recognizes a division between the validity
of the deed as between the parties and its status within the recording system.
In the former realm, the substance of the parties' deal governs regardless of
formalities; in the latter realm, formal rules prevail.
The architects of the USLTA embraced the ideal of anti-formalism,
applying it to conveyancing practices. The USLTA codifies the modem law
of the validity of deeds between the parties since it comports with anti-
formalism ideology. Thus, under the Act, the only formal requisite for a
deed, other than an identification of the parties and the land, is a signature
by the grantor or his representative.2
When it came to recording, the USLTA also seeks to cleanse the
system of formalities. The Act starkly provides: "No signature, acknowl-
edgement, seal, or witness is required for a document to be eligible for
recording."29 Dropping the last two requisites reflects present state law and
is sound. Dropping the first two completely reverses modem real estate
practice, which bars the recording of instruments that are not both signed
and acknowledged. Instead, instruments that patently are unenforceable as
between the parties are entitled to recordation.
27. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW (1987); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Robert S.
Summers, The Fonnal Character of Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242 (1992).
28. U.S.L.T.A. § 2-201. This comports with the standard principle that, as between the
parties, an acknowledgement is not necessary. The USLTA also makes it clear that neither
a seal nor a witness is necessary. l § 2-201(c). Again, this is not a significant change, as
modem law has eviscerated the historic importance of writings under seal and only several
states require third-party witnesses for deeds.
29. Id. § 2-301(b).
1996] 1175
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Recorded instruments under the USLTA system, provided they are
signed, carry strong presumptions of legitimacy.3" These presumptions do
not depend on whether the instrument is notarized or otherwise acknowl-
edged. Thus, the USLTA reform directly raises the policy question whether
acknowledgement of deeds and other instruments that affect title to real
estate serves a useful purpose. The drafters apparently believe acknowledge-
ment to be worthless. A comment observes: "Whatever the office of notary
public once was, other methods, in particular civil liability for slander of
title and possible criminal sanctions now appear to provide more effective
and less burdensome methods of discouraging fraudulent behavior."'" No
empirical evidence bearing on the cost of notarizing real estate documents
is offered, nor is any foundation given for the sanguine conclusion that real
estate fraud is largely a thing of the past because modem crooks are afraid
of slander of title actions and criminal prosecutions.
There are two reasons why the requirement of acknowledgement for
recorded instruments may be worth retaining. First, although it obviously
cannot stop all fraud stemming from forgery, it makes the forger's task at
least a little harder. The forger must either dupe a notary public or obtain
illegal access to the notary's tools, including his seal. Granted, a determined
forger may succeed in doing this, but it is more probable that at least some
will be deterred, diverted to other affairs. The USLTA recording reforms,
by ridding the system of formalities, ignore the real-world reliance placed
on recorded instruments and stack the cards in favor of the forger or the
forger's transferee.
Second and more importantly, acknowledgement is the only reason
whether a presumption of legitimacy makes sense. The USLTA, as noted
above, retains the well-established concept that a recorded signed instrument
is presumed to be signed by the person named as grantor and is presumed
to be delivered. This presumption makes sense under present law because
acknowledgement evidences that the instrument was apparently signed in the
presence of a disinterested third-party who is acting in an official capaci-
ty-the notary. Without this safeguard, not only is a forged unacknowl-
edged deed recordable, once it is recorded it is presumed valid under the
USLTA. The true owner who is the victim of the forgery has the burden
of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not sign the
deed.
30. Id. § 2-305.
31. Id. § 2-201 cmt. 3.
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Typically, the two main problems raised when the law imposes formal
requirements upon market transactions are costs of compliance and sanctions
applied to noncompliers. Acknowledgement of deeds and other instruments
is not costless, but the costs are not high. Most deeds are prepared by
attorneys or other professionals who have ready, convenient access to
employees who are licensed notary publics. The USLTA reform would
benefit society by reducing notaries' workloads (but will this raise
unemployment?), thus marginally reducing transaction costs for sellers and
buyers of land. It is questionable, however, whether this small cost savings
overcomes the probable benefits of fraud prevention and protection of true
owners referred to above.
With respect to noncompliance with the formality of acknowledgement,
a very small percentage of recorded instruments either are unacknowledged
or defectively acknowledged. Such defects raise legal problems because the
instruments are ineligible for recording, but are recorded in fact. The
USLTA seeks to resolve the dichotomy, eliminating the need for courts
occasionally to struggle with this problem. Solving this problem by statute
is not highly important for two reasons. First, the risk is minimal in a
statistical sense for several reasons. The requirement of notarization or
another form of acknowledgement is extremely familiar to real estate
attorneys, brokers, and everyone else who regularly deals with real estate.
In most states, the risk from defective acknowledgements is substantially
reduced by title curative acts and state and local bar standards that govern
real estate titles. And even when there is a defective acknowledgement that
is not cured by a statute or another doctrine, such as adverse possession, it
is rare that loss will result. There can be a loss to the record claimant
whose chain of title includes the defect only if an innocent third-party has
stumbled upon the scene.32
Second, the minor statistical risk that remains in modem real estate
practice is handled satisfactorily by title insurance. Virtually all lenders and
most informed buyers obtain title insurance policies, which afford economic
32. For example, assume A has conveyed to B and B has conveyed to C. The A-to-B
deed is genuine (signed and delivered by A), but it is defectively acknowledged. C has no
risk from A because the A-to-B deed binds C. C is subject to some third-party risk, but it
is remote. Much must happen. C loses some or all of his property only if A makes an
adverse conveyance by, for example, selling the land to X. In this event, X may gain
paramount title versus C on the theory that the A-B deed, which should not have been
recorded, does not impart constructive notice to X. But X will succeed in almost all states
(which have notice or race-notice recording acts) only if: 1) C is not in possession of the
land and 2) X does not order a title search of the records (if X searches the records, X will
see the A-to-B deed and will be bound by actual notice).
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protection against the risk that loss will result from a defect concerning
acknowledgement of an instrument in their chain of title. The USLTA
recording reform fails to recognize that the real-world problem of parties
failing to observe recording formalities, such as acknowledgement, is
substantially solved by the institution of title insurance. Whatever vices
stem from formalism, in this arena they were already minimized by the
impact of another institution.
V. SOLUTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE ORDERING OF PARTIES
A. Risk of Loss under Executory Contracts
Under an executory contract of sale, the traditional common-law rule
is that the buyer bears the risk of loss from fire or other casualty from the
time the contract is signed. This rule is often explained as a corollary of the
doctrine of equitable conversion; the buyer has equitable title, which is the
substance of ownership, and the seller has legal title only for the purpose of
securing payment of the purchase price.
The ULTA reverses the traditional risk of loss rule, adopting the
position of the UVPRA. The UVPRAIULTA rule allocates the risk of
loss to the party who is in possession prior to closing. In other words, the
seller retains the risk of loss until closing, unless the buyer takes possession
33. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
UVPRA in 1935. There are some differences in language between the ULTA and the
UVPRA. The UVPRA shifts the risk to the seller only if "all or a material part of the
property is destroyed." U.V.P.R.A. § l(a). The ULTA, however, protects the buyer from
all destruction or damage, giving him the right to cancel if the loss "results in a substantial
failure of the real estate to conform to the contract." U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b)(1). For lesser
losses, the ULTA buyer has the right to pick either an abatement of the purchase price or the
benefit of the seller's insurance proceeds or condemnation proceeds. Compare U.V.P.R.A.
§ l(a) (1935) with U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b). The UVPRA risk allocations are overridden if the
loss is the fault of either party; the text of the ULTA is silent on the matter, but the
Commissioner's Comment states the loss should fall on a party who is at fault. Compare
U.V.P.R.A. § l(a), (b) with U.L.T.A. § 2-406 & cmt. 1. The ULTA covers escrow closings,
providing that the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the escrow conditions are fulfilled
if this happens before the buyer has taken possession. U.L.T.A. § 2-406(c)(2). The UVPRA
is silent on this matter. The UVPRA authorizes the parties to alter the statutory risk
allocations by express contract. U.V.P.R.A. § 1. The ULTA does not discuss this matter,
either in text or in the comments, although it is highly unlikely the authors meant to preclude
the parties from contracting out of the ULTA scheme.
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prior to closing. For most sales, this means the seller retains the risk of loss
until closing because most buyers do not take possession until closing.
34
Twelve states have adopted the UVPRA, beginning with South Dakota
in 1937. Long ago, the adoption process ground to a halt, reflecting the
lack of contemporary concern about risk of loss among real estate profes-
sionals.35 Why is there so little interest in the rule? The most important
facet of both the traditional pro-seller equitable conversion doctrine and the
UVPRA rule is that it is an implied rule, which the parties are free to
alter.36 And parties to written contracts of sale virtually always exercise
this freedom.
A state's baseline risk of loss rule, whatever it may be, is not very
significant because the parties' contract almost always has an express
provision that governs risk of loss. Solving the problem this way is not
expensive. With only two parties involved, transaction costs are generally
low. Whenever a buyer is represented by an attorney, the contract will
expressly deal with risk of loss. In a state following the traditional rule, an
attorney who fails to have the contract address the issue would be guilty of
malpractice. Many buyers, especially home buyers, do not hire an attorney
and, accordingly, they are more vulnerable to the traditional rule. However,
such buyers typically use a standard-form contract, often approved by a bar
association or a brokers' association. Virtually all standard contracts address
risk of loss, providing the buyer with a substantial degree of protection. In
the large majority of transactions, that provision allocates all or most of the
risk of loss to the seller. The implied rule thus applies to an extremely
small percentage of real estate purchase transactions. This is the primary
reason why so few states have bothered to change the traditional risk of loss
rule. Granted, it may occasionally disappoint an unsophisticated buyer who
is not represented by an attorney and who does not use a standard-form
contract, but this is rare.
In essence, private ordering by parties to real property sales adequately
handles risk of loss issues, making statutory reform relatively unnecessary.
34. The buyer has the right to take possession prior to closing only if both parties agree.
Conceptually, this rule (that the right to possession follows legal title) is inconsistent with
the doctrine of equitable conversion. Saying that the buyer has equitable title (the most
important thing) from the signing of the contract implies that the buyer should have
possession or its fruits.
35. Since Oklahoma became the tenth state to adopt the UVPRA in 1965, only Nevada,
in 1977, and Texas, in 1989, have passed the Act. See U.V.P.R.A., 14 U.L.A. 469 (1990).
36. U.V.P.R.A. § 1. Oddly, the ULTA is silent on the right of the parties to change the
statutory rule.
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There is little real-world need for any state to change its risk of loss rule.
Modem critics of the traditional rule have cogently stated their case.
37
They are right. The traditional rule is founded on ancient, outmoded
assumptions and in principle should be discarded, even though it harms
extraordinarily few purchasers. However, what rule should replace the
traditional rule is far from clear.38 While the UVPRA/ULTA rule is better
in principle as reflecting the parties' probable expectations, for a state to
switch to this rule is not costless, and for this reason it is debatable whether
the costs exceed the benefits.
Two major costs of switching rules are apparent. First, the UVPRA
and ULTA fail to set forth bright-line rules; their indeterminacy invites
litigation much more than the relatively crisp traditional rule. Consider two
examples of indeterminacy. Under the UVPRA/ULTA, the buyer can
terminate due to casualty loss only if it results in a substantial failure of the
real estate to conform to the contract. The term "substantial" is not defined,
and in all but the easiest cases, buyer and seller will urge different
interpretations. For losses that are less than substantial, the buyer cannot
37. See Robert L. Flores, A Comparison of the Rules and Rationales for Allocating Risks
Arising in Realty Sales Using Executory Sale Contracts and Escrows, 59 Mo. L. REv. 307,
311 n.20 (1994).
38. One substantial flaw of the UVPRAIULTA rule is that it applies only if neither party
is at fault in causing the casualty loss. This is not an innovation, but a continuation of a tort-
based fault principle customarily followed under the traditional equitable conversion regime.
This is another example of the drafters of UVPRAIULTA ignoring institutional and market
changes. In medieval England, the crucible that gave birth to the fault-modified equitable
conversion doctrine, a farmer whose barn burned did not call the "good hands people" at
Allstate. Prudent property management by a landowner did not include obtaining fire and
extended casualty insurance.
A modern risk of loss rule should take account of the fact that today casualty insurance
is widespread and its purpose is to protect the owner from all covered losses, regardless of
whether they stem from the owner's negligence or the negligence of others. Most fires are
caused by someone's carelessness. Negligence of either party should be immaterial insofar
as insurable risks are concerned.
In any executory contract of sale where the property contains a valuable building or
other improvement that may suffer casualty loss, the property should be insured and, if it is
not, the allocation of the risk of loss should turn on which party should have obtained
insurance, not which party might be found negligent. In the absence of the parties' expressly
contracting on responsibility for obtaining insurance, the preferable rule is to put the
insurance burden on the seller. In most cases the seller will have insurance at the time the
contract is signed. Indeed, if the seller's property is mortgaged, as most real estate is, the
sellers' mortgagee almost always requires casualty insurance in order to protect its collateral.
For a seller to cancel his insurance policy after signing a contract of sale but before closing
would constitute a breach under his mortgage.
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terminate, but is entitled to a price abatement equal to the reduction in fair
market value caused by the loss. Again, the parties seldom will agree on
the number, and buyer and seller will each find real estate appraisers to
support their views.39
A second major switching cost is educational. Attorneys who are
intimately familiar with the traditional risk of loss rule and how to protect
their buyer-clients from its bite will have to learn the new rule. They, of
course, will also have to learn to protect their seller-clients from aspects of
the new rule that, in the context of a particular transaction, may seem
undesirable. This perhaps is not much of a problem. Many states have
mandatory continuing legal education for lawyers, and speakers at these
affairs always need topics to address.
The need to learn the new rule is a more important concern for
nonlawyers, in particular those buyers and sellers who transact without
hiring a lawyer. Most of these parties use standard-form contracts, and in
many states the process of revising standard realty contracts is haphazard.
While, as stated above, standard-form contracts virtually always have an
express provision addressing risk of loss, it is not always the case that those
provisions replace the entirety of the traditional rule. Sometimes there is an
interplay between the express provision and the traditional rule. This
interplay, where it exists, means that the standard contract should be revised
as soon as the state legislature changes the base line rule.40 In many states,
39. Indeterminacy is also added by the ULTA's decision to retain the fault principle to
override the basic rule allocating risk to the possessor. This raises another litigable issue in
many cases. Usually the possessor is the party most likely to be charged with negligence,
but there are potential claims against the nonpossessor. For example, buyer takes possession
in January two weeks before closing and the pipes freeze and break. Is buyer at fault for not
taking precautions, such as letting the faucets drip? Is seller at fault for not warning buyer
to take this step when the temperatures fall to the teens?
40. For example, Georgia follows the traditional rule that places the risk of loss on the
buyer. See, e.g., Bleckley v. Langston, 143 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that
buyer of pecan grove bears damages to trees from ice storm). A recent standard-form
contract provides:
Should the Property be destroyed or substantially damaged before time of
closing, Seller is to notify immediately the Buyer or Broker, after which the
Buyer may declare this Agreement void and receive a refund of the earnest
money deposited. In the event Buyer elects not to void this Agreement at this
time, then within five (5) calendar days after Seller receives notification of the
amount of the insurance proceeds, if any, Seller shall notify Buyer of the amount
of insurance proceeds and the Seller's intent to repair or not to repair said
damage. Within five (5) calendar days of Seller's notification, Buyer may (A)
declare this Agreement void and receive a refund of the earnest money deposited,
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standard contracts in wide use are examined and revised by legal experts
only sporadically. Consequently, after a change in the law, many parties for
a considerable period of time will use unrevised standard contracts that are
inadequate and partially obsolete.
B. Specific Perfonnance of Executory Contracts
The well-accepted baseline rule, learned religiously in first-year
property, is that either party to a real estate contract of sale is ordinarily
entitled to specific performance if the other party defaults.4' The ULTA
retains the traditional rule for buyers, but overturns it for sellers. With
respect to the buyer's remedy, a ULTA comment states that the Act
or (B) consummate this agreement and receive such insurance as is paid on claim
of loss if Seller has elected not to repair said damage.
Purchase and Sale Agreement 9 (Ga. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. 1995). With this clause under
present Georgia law, who is in possession does not matter, and Buyer retains the risk of loss
for damage that is less than "substantial" and for takings by eminent domain. The effect of
the clause on the parties' rights is reasonably clear, given the backdrop of existing law.
Were Georgia to adopt the ULTA or UVPRA risk provision, this paragraph should be
redrafted because it would create grave ambiguities in three instances. First, if the buyer
took possession prior to closing and substantial damage occurred, the buyer would argue the
clause applies. The seller, however, would argue the statute applies because the clause
assumes the seller is in possession and does not expressly provide a risk of loss rule for the
buyer pre-closing possession. See U.L.T.A. § 2-406(c)(1). Second, if the damage was less
than "substantial," the seller would argue the clause applies to place the risk on the buyer,
but the buyer would argue the statute gives the buyer the right to an abatement of the
purchase price. See id. § 2-406(b)(2). Third, if the government condemned all or part of the
property, the buyer would argue that the statute applies, but the seller would argue the clause
completely displaces the statute and permits the buyer to terminate only for physical
destruction or damage.
41. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 180 (3d ed. 1989); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 682-
83 (2d ed. 1993). A traditional principle of equity limits specific performance to situations
in which damages are inadequate. As to the buyer, the justification for making specific
performance freely available is that each parcel of land is unique. Typically, courts presume
uniqueness, with no requirement that the buyer prove his needs cannot be met by the
purchase of a substitute tract. As to the seller, the uniqueness rationale is not available
because he has bargained for money, the most fungible type of property in existence. As
noted below, there are not that many reported cases that address specific performance for
sellers. Nonetheless, the available cases generally award specific performance to sellers,
without a discrete showing of the inadequacy of damages, often based on the idea that the
parties' remedies should be mutual. A few modem courts have rejected the concept of
mutuality of remedy. E.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1974).
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"continues the existing law under which a buyer of real estate is entitled to
specific performance."'42
For the seller, a comment asserts that under existing law "a seller of a
freehold interest is automatically entitled to specific performance,"43 an
exaggeration given the equitable limits traditionally imposed on the
remedy." Departing from present law, the Act restricts the seller's right
to bring what is described as an "action for the price" to the situation where
"the seller is unable after a reasonable effort to resell it at a reasonable price
or the circumstances reasonably indicate the effort will be unavailing."
'4 5
Instead of specific performance, the seller may recover expectancy damages,
based on the difference between the contract price and the fair market value
of the property,46 or the seller may resell the property and recover the
difference between the contract price and the resale price.47
The seller's right to obtain specific performance if the buyer defaults
is not very important. In modem real estate practice, it is a very rare case
where it makes sense for the seller to litigate a specific performance claim
to its conclusion. The prime remedy for real estate sellers is to terminate
the contract, retain the earnest money already paid by the buyer, and seek
another buyer.4" There is far more litigation in the courts over whether the
seller may or may not retain the buyer's earnest money than over the
question whether the seller may obtain specific performance. The ULTA
42. U.L.T.A. § 2-511 cmt. The language of the Act itself is less clear, providing only
"[s]pecific performance may be decreed against a seller," with no hint as to whether this
should happen often or rarely. Id. § 2-511(a).
43. Id. § 2-506 cmt. 1.
44. Most courts, true to the historic tenets of equity jurisprudence, retain discretion to
deny specific performance when the facts and circumstances show that specific performance
would be unfair, harsh, or inequitable. See, e.g., Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 874
(Ga. 1984) (holding that a purchaser must prove value of property so court can determine if
price is "fair, just and not against good conscience").
45. U.L.T.A. § 2-506(b).
46. Id. § 2-505(a).
47. Id. § 2-504.
48. Even though the seller's right to specific performance is seldom judicially exercised,
it may serve another role. When a buyer refuses to go forward and the seller claims the
buyer has breached, negotiation often ensues. The seller's arguable right to specifically
enforce the contract may serve as leverage for negotiation. This thought perhaps underlies
the traditional notion of mutuality of remedies; because the buyer has the right to specific
performance, on the theory that land is unique, the seller should also have that right. Mutual
rights to specific performance serves to equalize the parties' bargaining positions.
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has an important provision authorizing liquidated damages.49  This
provision codifies present law, which allows the seller to retain the buyer's
deposit as liquidated damages if it is reasonable in amount, considering facts
such as the probable harm stemming from default and the difficulty of
proving actual harm.5"
The ULTA revision may be right, as a matter of principle, in adopting
a bright-line rule that generally disqualifies sellers of real property from
obtaining specific performance. As a strategy for drafting a uniform statute
that is likely to be enacted, this reform is not advisable. The existing rule
does not have a major impact on many real-world transactions. Private
ordering by buyers and sellers, reflected in the bargains they reach and
document in written contracts, demonstrate that earnest money payment and
retention is a key contract provision and that the seller's right to specific
performance is not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the ULTA and the USLTA were ambitious, seeking to
overhaul a good many long-embedded property law doctrines. They sought
to purge the law of ancient rules perceived no longer to serve the needs of
modem markets. In so doing, they went too far. Instead of focusing on a
small number of revisions to rules that were both obsolete and harmful, they
painted with a broad brush, fashioning a code decreeing sweeping changes
to the property laws of any state that chose enactment. Uniform acts
succeed only if they respond to significant needs felt by market participants.
For the ULTA and the USLTA, this impetus was lacking. By trying to sell
a major reform package, they made nationwide adoption improbable. In so
doing, the goal of uniformity was sacrificed to the goal of legal perfection.
49. U.L.T.A. § 2-516(a) states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement, but only
in an amount that is not unreasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the time the real estate is withheld from the market,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A provision for unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void.
Id.
50. It may have been more useful if the Act contained guidelines bearing on amounts
that the seller may retain. Given the tremendous variety in types of contracts, including their
duration, hard-and-fast rules probably would be unwise. Some courts, however, presume that
the seller generally may retain a deposit of up to 10% of the purchase price. A statutory
presumption along these lines would be worthwhile guidance for parties and for the courts.
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In essence, the reformers aimed at too many targets. In two categories,
ammunition was sent toward the wrong marks. First, they assumed that
direct legislative action to solve a problem is preferable to market-based
solutions, without making a careful examination as to the necessity for and
costs of market intervention. The potential for solutions by other market
institutions was overlooked. With respect to implied warranties of quality
for the sale of new homes, the Acts mandated the use of a single standard,
depriving the parties of the freedom of choosing to make their own bargain.
This choice neglected the emerging response of the home-building industry
in creating a system of private warranties, spearheaded by the HOW
program. Similarly, the Acts' call for the elimination of formalities for
recorded deeds and other recorded instruments ignored the fact that very few
private parties misunderstand the formalities and that, when they do, the
system of title insurance provides affordable protection from the risk at low
cost to the parties.
Second, in identifying problem areas, the Acts' architects disregarded
the extent to which private ordering by parties, in written real property
agreements, replace implied legal rules, greatly diminishing the importance
of the implied rules. With respect to risk of loss, buyers almost always
contract for some modification to the doctrine of equitable conversion,
which generally allocates the entire risk to the buyer. With respect to
specific performance, this remedy is generally not attractive for sellers, who
in case of buyer default, strongly prefer to retain the buyer's earnest money
as liquidated damages.
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